Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 80
Issue 3 The SEC at 70
3-1-2005

A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance
Joel Seligman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1159 (2005).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol80/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 9

A MODEST REVOLUTION IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Joel Seligman*
INTRODUCTION

The federal securities laws do not embody a general corporation
law. The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) involvement
in corporate governance long has been largely reactive and incremental. In the period just before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, however, the pace of SEC initiatives has significantly accelerated
and today amounts to a modest revolution in corporate governance.'
The background of this modest revolution is the rudimentary
state law of corporate governance. In the leading Delaware General
Corporation Law, section 141 (a) provides that "the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." 2 Section
211(b) provides for an annual meeting of shareholders to elect the
board,3 which section 141 (b) provides shall consist of one or more
persons 4 and section 141 (d) provides may be divided into one, two, or
Dean and Ethan A. H. Shepley Professor, Washington University School of
Law in St. Louis. I would like to thank the organizers of "The SEC at 70" symposium
where I spoke: Notre Dame Law School, Julian Velasco, and Lisa Casey. I am
particularly grateful that a symposium was held in honor of A. A. Sommer, Jr., one of
the greatest figures in post-World War II securities regulation.
1 See generallyJoel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporateand Securities
Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2002) [hereinafter Seligman, No One Can Serve
Two Masters] (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
In the post-World War II period, there have been periodic proposals-none
adopted-to totally preempt state corporate law with some form of federal incorpora*

RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING
tion statute, at least for the largest corporations. See, e.g.,
THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Donald E.Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of

Corporations,31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976). For more modest proposals, see William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974);
Joel Seligman, The Casefor FederalMinimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REv.
947 (1990).
2

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).

3
4

Id. § 211(b).
Id. § 141(b).
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three classes (meaning that all, one-half, or one-third of the directors
shall be elected each year). 5 Under section 141(b), there are no required qualifications to be a member of the board. 6 Under section
141 (c), the board, by resolution, may delegate specified functions to
one or more committees. 7 There are no required officers, but section
142(a) authorizes the corporation to "have such officers with such tites and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the
8
board of directors."
For a considerable period the statutory dominant role of the corporate board of directors has been disputed. As early as 1934 then
Professor William 0. Douglas decried Directors Who Do Not Direct.9 In
1971 and again in 1979 Harvard Business School Professor Myles
Mace characterized the statutory board role as "mythic" and "unrealistic."' 10 To manage the corporation, the board has long lacked the
time," information,1 2 and was limited by a selection process in which
5
6
7
8
9
10
Myth

Id. § 141(d).
Id. § 141(b).
Id. § 141(c).
Id. § 141(a).
William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934).
MYLES L. MACE, DIREcroRs: MYrH AND REALITY (1971); Myles L. Mace, Directors:
and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 293 (1979). But see JAY W.

LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALIrY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BoARDs (1989)

(providing a more optimistic view).
11 As practitioner Martin Lipton and Professor Lorsch explained in 1992:
Based on our experience, the most widely shared problem directors have is a
lack of time to carry out their duties. The typical board meets less than eight
times annually. Even with committee meetings and informal gatherings
before or after the formal board meeting, directors rarely spend as much as
a working day together in and around each meeting. Further, in many boardrooms too much of this limited time is occupied with reports from management and various formalities. In essence, the limited time outside directors
have together is not used in a meaningful exchange of ideas among themselves or with management/inside directors.
Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposalfor Improved Corporate Governance, 48
Bus. LAW. 59, 64 (1992).
12 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HouS. & URBAN Aer., 96TH CONG., SEC STAFF REPORT
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1980) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY].
Assuring that adequate information is provided to directors remains one of
the most critical and difficult problems which boards of directors are facing
today. The Business Roundtable's Statement on "The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors" goes so far as to state that "certainly some of
the corporate failures of recent years are traceable in large measure to the
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even outside or nonmanagement directors depended on management for their tenure as directors.1 3 Under state law the corporate
chief executive officer (CEO), not the board, historically has dominated corporate governance. 14 At its best the strong-CEO-weakerboard model was consistent with a "monitoring" rather than a managerial role for the board. 15 At its worst, the strong-CEO-weaker-board
model has long been associated with the conflicts of interest that
fact that directors were inadequately informed. The facts were available at
lower levels of the corporation but were not communicated."
Id.
13 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 (1991).
First, even financially independent outside directors depend on management for their tenure as directors, since management typically selects its own
outside directors. Thus, directors who wish to retain their positions are not
independent of management. Second, most outside directors share management's ideological disposition toward the single issue most central to
their monitoring responsibilities: how intensely outside directors should
monitor management. Some 63 percent of the outside directors of public
companies are chief executive officers of other public companies. These
directors are unlikely to monitor more energetically than they believe they
should be monitored by their own boards. Third, outside directors are not
"
socially independent. As Victor Brudney put it, [n]o definition of independence yet offered precludes an independent director from being a social
friend of, or a member of the same clubs, associations, or charitable efforts
as, the persons whose [performance] he is asked to assess." Finally, in addition to these dependency, ideological, and social obstacles to monitoring,
outside directors typically lack an affirmative incentive to monitor effectively.
The corporation cannot simply pay outside directors a large sum to induce
careful monitoring because the prospect of a large payment itself would undercut their financial independence. Yet any serious effort to monitor inevitably imposes large personal costs on outside directors. As many
commentators have pointed out, outside directors lack the time, expertise,
staff, and information to challenge management, while management controls not only these resources but also has a direct and powerful incentive to
direct corporate policy without interference.
Id.
14 See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 133-39
(1995) (discussing the functional limitations on the board's managerial role).
15 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.02 comment a (1994), describing five primary functions in a monitoring role:
1. Select, regularly evaluate and, if necessary, replace the chief executive officer. Determine management compensation. Review succession
planning.
2. Review and, where appropriate, approve the financial objectives, major
strategies, and plans of the corporation.

3. Provide advice and counsel to top management.
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Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means memorably popularized in their
6
1932 classic, The Modem Corporation and PrivateProperty.1
I.

THE

SEC

AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEFORE THE
SARBANES-OxLEY ACT OF

A.

2002

The SEC's Proxy Rules

To the extent that the federal securities law initially addressed
corporate governance, it did so through section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which empowers the SEC to adopt rules
that address the solicitation of proxies by corporations and other juridical persons whose securities are registered with the Commission
under section 12.17 The potential for the SEC to adopt disclosure
rules concerning corporate nominees and corporate meetings was a
response to the opacity of the pre-1934 blank proxy which often
sought outside shareholder delegation of voting authority though a
proxy without disclosing what votes would be taken at an annual or
18
periodic shareholder meeting.
The Commission's power under section 14(a) is not limited to
ensuring full disclosure. 19 Some of the proxy rules, for example, address the requirement that security holders be given an opportunity to
vote for or against each proposal. 20 But the Commission's basic philosophy under its proxy rules has been largely one of disclosure.
4. Select and recommend to shareholders for election an appropriate slate
of candidates for the board of directors; evaluate board processes and
performance.
5. Review the adequacy of systems to comply with all applicable laws/
regulations.
Id.
16 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY bk. 1, chs. 5-6 (3d rev. ed. 1991). Berle and Means memorably con-

tended that in the modem corporation there had been a separation of ownership and
control with most of the common stock then held by a majority of public or outside
shareholders and control of the corporation in fact exercised by management groups
with minority stock interests. To Berle and Means, this posed a fundamental threat to
the public shareholder. Management groups might pursue their personal interest in
higher salaries, favorable stock options, or other conflicts of interest at the expense of
the majority of public shareholders.
17 The section 12 registration requirements are analyzed in 4 Louis Loss &JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 6.A (3d ed. rev. 2000). The Commission's section 14(a) proxy rules are analyzed in chapter 6.C.
18 See id. at 1916-17.
19 SeeJoel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 717-19 (1986).
20 Proxy Rule 14a-4(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b) (2004).
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The Commission's most significant proxy rules require a solicitation on behalf of the issuer with respect to an annual meeting for the
election of directors to be accompanied or preceded by an annual
report to security holders that includes (1) balance sheets for two
years and income and cash flows statements for three, all audited and
prepared on a consolidated basis, (2) selected financial data, and (3)
management's analysis of financial condition and results of
21
operations.
Rule 14a-8 also allows eligible shareholders at corporate expense
to make one proposal for shareholder action, including any accompanying supporting statement if both do not exceed 500 words. 22 Rule
14a-8, however, does not permit outside shareholders to nominate directors at the corporation's expense.
The SEC, on three occasions, has contemplated whether shareholders should have this pivotal power. In 1943 SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell testified to a House Subcommittee of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Purcell indicated that in August
1942 the Commission's staff had proposed a rule to permit shareholders "to use the management's proxy statement to canvass stockholders
23
generally for the election of their own nominees for directorships."
The Commission opposed this rule. 2 4 An accompanying memorandum described the proposal and the Commission's objections. Any
security holder could nominate directorial candidates, but management-on an equitable basis-would only be required to include
twice as many candidates on the proxy as positions to be filled. According to the memorandum, there were no reasons to support this
proposal. But, among other objections, the Commission (1) doubted
it had the authority to change the proxy into a ballot, (2) feared unqualified persons might be nominated, and (3) doubted the equitable
25
basis test would be workable.

21 Proxy Rule 14a-3(b)(1)-(9), id. § 240.14a-3(b)(1)-(9). In addition, the proxy
statement must contain an undertaking to supply each solicited person who makes a
written request the annual Form 10-K or Form 10-KSB report filed with the Commission. Proxy Rule 14a-3(b) (10), id. § 240.14a-3(b) (10).
22 See generally 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1992-2060 (discussing the
security holder proposals of Rule 14a-8).
23 Securities andExchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearingson HA 1493, H.R. 1821,
and H.R. 2019 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 19
(1943) (statement of Ganson Purcell, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
24
25

Id. (statement of Ganson Purcell, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
Id. at 157 (statement of Ganson Purcell, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
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In 1977 the SEC initiated a hearing process to consider a broad
26
reexamination of the shareholders' role in corporate governance.
The background of the reexamination was explained in a Commission
Release:
During the last two years, more than three hundred and fifty corporations have made disclosures, in public documents filed with the
Commission, of a wide variety of questionable and illegal corporate
practices including bribes, kickbacks, illegal political contributions,
and improper accounting practices. As noted in the "Report of the
Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices," submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 12, 1976),
"[t]he almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed . .. by
the Commission has been the apparent frustration of our system of
corporate accountability .... -27
Beginning in 1978, as a result of these hearings, the Commission
adopted a series of new proxy disclosure requirements concerning the
board and shareholder voting, but did not adopt a rule permitting
shareholder nomination of directors at corporate expense. 2 8
In July 2003, after corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and
other major corporations, 2 9 the SEC Division of Corporation Finance

published Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors in response to a proposal of the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Pension Plan
to require companies to include in their proxy materials the nominee
of any shareholder or group of shareholders beneficially owning three
30
percent or more of a company's outstanding common stock.
The staff described five alternatives to increase shareholders' involvement in the nomination and election of directors, including:
requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials;
26 Shareholder
change Act Release
27 Id. at 23,902
28 Shareholder
change Act Release

Communication, Participation, and Corporate Governance, ExNo. 13,482, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (May 11, 1977).
n.1.
Communication, Participation, and Corporate Governance, ExNo. 15,384, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522 (Dec. 6, 1978). See generally SEC
STAFF REPORT ON CORPoRATE AccOUNTABILITY, supra note 12 (detailing recommendations). In 1980 the Commission staff did not doubt that the SEC had authority to
adopt a shareholder nomination rule. Id. at 100, 103-08.
29 See Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters, supra note 1, at 451-67.
30 Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process
Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.

Rep. (CCH) 1 86,938 (July 15, 2003).
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5

requiring companies to deliver nominating shareholder proxy
cards along with company proxy materials; . . . [and]

*

revising Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholder proposals
3
relating to a company's nomination process. '

With respect to shareholder access, the Report stated:
The Division recommends that the Commission propose and solicit
public comment on new proxy rules that would allow a shareholder
or a group of shareholders to place their nominees in a company's
proxy materials within the following parameters:
*

the availability of a shareholder nomination process should be
premised upon the occurrence of one or more triggering events
that are objective criteria evidencing potential deficiencies in
the proxy process such that shareholder views-especially those
of a majority-may not otherwise be adequately taken into
account;
* there should be appropriate standards for independence of
shareholder nominees; [and]
*

there should be limitations on the total number or percentage
32
of permitted shareholder nominees.

SEC Chair William Donaldson soon asked the Division to prepare
33
rule proposals that would implement its recommendations.
Later in 2003, the Commission proposed Rule 14a-11 based on
the Staff Report. 34 Proposed Rule 14a-11 would permit a security
holder, either individually or in a group that beneficially owns more
than five percent of the registrant's securities, to nominate one or
more persons for the board provided that
[o] ne or more of the following events has occurred during the calendar year in which the meeting that is the subject of the proxy
statement is being held or during either of the preceding two calendar years:
(i)

At least one of the registrant's nominees for the board of directors for whom the registrant solicited proxies received "with-

31 Id. 87,872.
32 Id. 87,887.
33 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Publishes Staff Report on Proxy Process Review (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2003-83.htm.
34 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 68
Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct. 14, 2003).
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hold" votes from more than 35% of the votes cast at an annual
meeting of security holders ...
(ii)

; or

A security holder proposal providing that the registrant become subject to [Rule] 14a-11 that was submitted pursuant to
[Rule] 14a-8 by a security holder or group of security holders
that held more than 1% of the securities entitled to vote on
that proposal for at least one year as of the date the proposal
was submitted and provided evidence of such holding to the
registrant, received more than 50% of the votes cast on that
proposal at an annual meeting of security holders .... 3

Under proposed Rule 14a-1l (d) (1) a registrant would not be required to include more than one nominee if there were fewer than
eight directors; two, if there were more than eight but fewer than
36
twenty; and three, if there were more than twenty directors.
Proposed Rule 14a-1 1 represents the first SEC rule that would
permit direct shareholder nomination of directors. As such it is a significant proposal. 3 7 It is worth stressing, however, how limited the
proxy access proposal, in fact, is. The two key trigger events, (i) the
thirty-five percent withheld vote for at least one board nominee and
(ii) the receipt of fifty percent or more of a vote for a Rule 14a-8
proposal by a one-percent owner of stock, are both extremely rare
events. Based on a sample of 2227 director elections during the past
two years, the Commission reported that approximately 1.1% had total withheld votes in excess of thirty-five percent cast.38 A review of a
sample of 237 security holder proposals subfnitted in 2002 found that
only three were submitted by an owner of more than one percent of
35 Id. at 60,819.
36 Id. at 60,822.
37 The proposal release was notable for not addressing SEC authority to adopt a
director nomination rule, an issue that wisely should have been raised given Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See generally Task Force on S'holder
Proposals of the Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar Ass'n, Report on Proposed
Changes in Proxy Rules and Regulations Regarding Proceduresfor the Election of Corporate
Directors, 59 Bus. LAW. 109, 130-36 (2003) (outlining basic issues in SEC authority and
federalism concerns).
On December 22, 2003, the Business Roundtable filed a seventy-six page comment on the SEC's proposed election contest rules stressing its belief "that the Commission lacks the statutory authority to adopt the Proposed Election Contest Rules."
DETAILED COMMENTS OF BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE "PROPOSED ELECTION CONTEST

RuLEs" OF THE U.S. SECURmES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (2003), availableat http:/

/www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt22203.pdf; see also U.S. Chamber Urges SEC
to Drop Proposed Shareholder Access Rule, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1029 (2004).
Chamber Senior Vice President David Hirschmann stated: "If the Commission proceeds with this proposal, we will challenge it in court." Id.
38 Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789.
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the shares outstanding. Of the three, only one received more than
39
fifty percent of the votes cast.

When a proposal is able to satisfy either of these triggering
events, outside shareholder nomination of one or more directors can
only occur at a subsequent annual meeting of shareholders. This temporal delay is itself a novel impediment to the benefits that might be
achieved under the proposed rule.
B.

Audit Committee Requirements

A second SEC corporate governance initiative occurred in 1977
when the Commission approved a rule change in the listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to require each domestic company with common stock listed on that exchange "to
establish ...and maintain.., an audit committee comprised solely of

directors independent of management and free from any relationship
that, in the opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with the
exercise of independent judgment as a committee member." 40 This
was a salutary, if modest, reform. On March 11, 1976, when SEC
Chairman Roderick Hills had requested that the NYSE make this
amendment to its listing requirements, he estimated that almost
ninety percent of the nation's largest corporations already had estab41
lished audit committees.
After a 1999 Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audits 42 led to SEC adoption of new stock exchange

audit committee rules, 43 the audit committee again became a topic of
39
40
(Mar.
41

Id. at 60,790-91.
In re Unagusta Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 13,345, 11 S.E.C. Dock. 1945
9, 1977).
Roderick Hills, Addresses (June 21, 1976 &June 30, 1976), summarized inJOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 546-47 (3d ed. 2003).
42 The Blue Ribbon Committee recommended that all members of the audit
committee of an NYSE or NASD firm be independent directors and that each audit
committee member be financially literate. BLUE RIBBON COMM. ON IMPROVING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMS., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1999),
reprinted in Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of CorporateAudit Committees, 54 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1999).
43 In 1999, new audit requirements in response to the Blue Ribbon Committee
were approved by the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, and the NASD. New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., Amending Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 41,980, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,514 (proposed Oct. 13, 1999); New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Amending Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No.
42,233, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529 (Dec. 21, 1999); The American Stock Exchange Amending Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 41,981, 64 Fed. Reg.
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controversy. During the Senate Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs
Committee hearings in 2002 that preceded Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit
committee was sharply criticized for its ineffectuality. Former SEC
Chairman Roderick Hills, during whose term in 1977 the NYSE
adopted the requirement of the independent audit committee, was
detailed in his articulation of audit committee shortcomings:
* Audit committees may consist of people who satisfy the objective
criteria of independence, but their election to the board is too
often the whim of the CEO, who decides each year who will sit
on the audit committee and who will chair it.
* Audit committees too often seek only to reduce the cost of the
audit rather than to seek ways to improve its quality. They do
not play a sufficient role in determining what the fair fee should
be.
* Audit committees seldom ask the auditor if there is a better,
fairer, way to present the company's financial position.
* Audit committees seldom play a role in selecting a new audit
firm or in approving a change in the partner in charge of the
audit. They may well endorse an engagement or the appointment of a new team, but they are not seen as material to the
selection process.
" Audit committees seldom establish themselves as the party in
charge of the audit.

C.

44

Why Was Corporate Governance Not a GreaterPriority?

Compared to the more significant SEC mandatory disclosure program and the fraud and other remedies enforced by the SEC, the Justice Department, and private litigants, the Commission's
contributions to corporate governance before the Enron-SarbanesOxley period were minor, intermittent, and relatively ineffectual.
55,505 (proposed Oct. 13, 1999); The American Stock Exchange Amending Audit
Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 42,232, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,523
(Dec. 21, 1999); The American Stock Exchange Amending Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 44,256, 74 S.E.C. Dock. 9187 (May 3, 2001)
(amending Amex section 121 to clarify that domestic listed companies are required to

have a sufficient number of independent directors to satisfy the Exchange's audit
committee standard); Amending Nasdaq's Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 41,982, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,510 (proposed Oct. 13, 1999); The
American Stock Exchange Amending Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,213, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (Dec. 21, 1999).
44 Accounting Reform and Investor Protection:Hearings on H.R. 3763 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 78, 81 (2002) (prepared testimony of Roderick M. Hills, former Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
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There were practical reasons for the Commission's modest record
in corporate governance.
First, the Commission's most significant foray into corporate governance, its 1988 rule that generally required each common share to
have one vote, was held to exceed its authority in 1990 in the Business
Roundtable case.

45

Second, corporate governance was generally considered to be a
matter of state law outside the scope of what the SEC should address.
There was no real question given the United States Constitution's
Supremacy Clause that the SEC could seek legislation that would supplant the states in corporate law for a specified category of corporations and that the federal law would preempt or exist concurrently
with state law. The federal securities laws did exactly this with respect
to state disclosure and fraud remedies during the New Deal. But over
time there had evolved an implicit understanding that absent countervailing circumstances requiring federal preemption, areas such as corporate governance would remain exclusively or largely matters of state
law.46
Third, this federalist approach was reinforced by a powerful prudential consideration. The SEC is a relatively small federal agency,
often stretched quite thin in terms of resources, which is often challenged to effectively address its core responsibilities. 4 7 New initiatives
in corporate governance rarely rose to the top of the Commission's
list of priorities.
II.

THE SEC AND CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY

Then came Enron. Virtually overnight auditing and corporate
governance became two of the Commission's leading priorities. Elsewhere I have focused on auditing and the initial experience of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) .4 8 Let me
here address corporate governance.
45 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
46 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))).
47 See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at 630-39 (detailing how limited resources impaired core responsibilities during the 1993-2000 Levitt chairmanship).
48 See 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, ch. 2.D.3.c; SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at

714-41.
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Board Independence Requirements

Before the July 2002 enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee "in
the aftermath of the 'meltdown' of significant companies due to failures of diligence, ethics, and controls," recommended a broad set of
corporate governance reforms to the NYSE Board of Directors, which
generally adopted the recommendations and proposed them to the
SEC for approval. 49 These recommendations included requirements
that each NYSE-listed company have a majority of independent directors; the nominating or corporate governance committee, compensation committee, and audit committee be comprised solely of
independent directors; and the audit committee have sole authority to
50
hire and fire independent auditors.
In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress focused on the audit committee.
Section 301 of the Act adds section 10A(m) (2) to the Securities Exchange Act and expressly directs that
the audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity as a committee of
the board of directors, shall be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered
public accounting firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing
an audit report or related work, and each such registered public
accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee. 51
The audit committee is required to be comprised entirely of independent directors and is authorized to engage independent counsel
52
and other advisers.
49

See

N.Y. STOCK
(2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govre-

CORPORATE AccOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMM.,

EXCH., FINAL REPORT 1

port.pdf.
50 See the summary in Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters, supra note 1, at
495 n.111.
51 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (in) (West Supp. 2004).
52 Section 1OA(m) (3) (B) defines "independence" for the purposes of section
10A(m) to mean
a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or
her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or
any other board committee (i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or
(ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.
Id. § 78j-1 (m) (3) (B).
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In 2003 the Commission, to implement § 1OA(m) (1), adopted
Rule 1OA-3 as well as confirming amendments to specified forms and
disclosure rules. Rule 1OA-3(a) requires each national securities exchange and each national securities association to adopt the audit
1OA-3(b) 5 3 and provide
committee listing standards specified in Rule
54
the exemptions specified in Rule 1OA-3(c).
Rule 10A-3(b)(1)(ii) defines independence for noninvestment
companies to mean
a member of an audit committee .. may not, other than in his or
her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other board committee:
(A) Accept directly or indirectly any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary thereof,
provided that, unless the rules of the national securities exchange or national securities association provide otherwise,
compensatory fees do not include the receipt of fixed
amounts of compensation under a retirement plan (including
deferred compensation) for prior service with the listed issuer
(provided that such compensation is not contingent in any
way on continued service); or
53 Rule IOA-3(b) (2) specifies the responsibilities required of registered public accounting firms:
The audit committee of each listed issuer, in its capacity as a committee of
the board of directors, must be directly responsible for the appointment,
compensation, retention and oversight of the work of any registered public
accounting firm engaged (including resolution of disagreements between
management and the auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose
of preparing or issuing an audit report or performing other audit, review or
attest services for the listed issuer, and each such registered public accounting firm must report directly to the audit committee.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1OA-3(b) (2) (2004).
The audit committee under Rule IOA-3(b) (4) is authorized to engage independent counsel and other advisers "as it deems necessary to carry out its duties." Id.
§ 240.1OA-3(b) (4).
Similarly under Rule 1OA-3(b) (5) the issuer must provide appropriate funding
"as determined by the audit committee" for payment of "(i) [clompensation to any
registered public accounting firm engaged for the purpose of preparing or issuing an
audit report." Id. § 240.1OA-3(b) (5).
54 Rule 10A-3(c) includes exemptions for (1) other classes of securities when an
issuer has a listed security, (2) a direct or indirect consolidated subsidiary or an at
least fifty percent beneficiary-owned subsidiary of the issuer, (3) specified foreign private issuers, (4) a security futures product, (5) a standardized option, (6) asset-based
issuers and foreign governments, and (7) specified listed issuers organized as a trust
or other unincorporated association which does not have a board or similar body and
limits its activities to passive ownership. Id. § 240.10A-3(c).

1172

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:3

(B)

Be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary
55
thereof.
In 2003, after amendments, the Commission also approved new
NYSE corporate governance standards. 56 The NYSE revised Manual of
Listing Standards section 303A(1) requires the board of each listed
company to consist of a majority of independent directors. Under section 303A(2) no director would qualify as independent unless the
board of directors determines that the director has no material relationship with the company. Specifically, the NYSE tightened its definition of independent director in section 303A(2) (b), as the adoption
release explained:
First, a director who is an employee, or whose immediate family
member is an executive officer, of the company would not be independent until three years after the end of such employment relationship ("NYSE Employee Provision").... Second, a director who
receives, or whose immediate family member receives, more than
$100,000 per year in direct compensation from the listed company,
except for certain permitted payments, would not be independent
until three years after he or she ceases to receive more than
$100,000 per year in such compensation ("NYSE Direct Compensation Provision").
Third, a director who is affiliated with or employed by, or
whose immediate family member is affiliated with or employed in a
professional capacity by, a present or former internal or external
auditor of the company would not be independent until three years
after the end of the affiliation or the employment or auditing
relationship.
Fourth, a director who is employed, or whose immediate family
member is employed, as an executive officer of another company
where any of the listed company's present executives serve on that
company's compensation committee would not be independent until three years after the end of such service or the employment relationship ("NYSE Interlocking Directorate Provision").
55

Id. § 240.10A-3(b) (1) (ii). Section 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also requires

an audit committee to have a financial expert or explain why one was not selected for

the audit committee. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265. In 2003,
the Commission adopted new or amended rules to implement section 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Disclosure Required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Exchange Act Release No. 47,235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003).
56 New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Amendment, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051 (proposed Apr. 11, 2003); New York Stock
Exchange Corporate Governance Amendment, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68
Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003); see also NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A COR
PoRATE GOVERNANCE LISTING STANDARDS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2004), available at www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303Afaqs.pdf.
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Fifth, a director who is an executive officer or an employee, or
whose immediate family member is an executive officer, of a company that makes payments to, or receives payments from, the listed
company for property or services in an amount which, in any single
fiscal year, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other
company's consolidated gross revenues, would not be independent
below such threshold ("NYSE Business
until three years after falling
57
Relationship Provision").
Non-management directors, under section 303A(3), would be required to meet at regular intervals without management.
Each listed company, under section 303A(4) (a) and 303A(5),
would be required to have a nomination/corporate governance committee and a separate compensation committee composed entirely of
58
independent directors.
Section 303A(6) and (7) requires each NYSE-listed company to
have a minimum three person audit committee that meets the independence standards of both section 303A(2) and SEC Rule 10A-3.
NYSE section 303A(7) also requires each member of the audit committee to be financially literate as that term is interpreted by the full
board or to become financially literate within a reasonable period of
time after being appointed to the audit committee. In addition, at
least one member of the audit committee would be required to have
59
accounting or related financial marketing expertise.
57 NYSE and Nasdaq Rules of Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No.
48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,157 (Nov. 4, 2003) (footnotes omitted). This release
added:
The NYSE [defines] "immediate family member" to include a person's
spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers- and fathers-in-law, sons- and
daughters-in-law, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person's home. The NYSE [intends] references to "company" include any parent or subsidiary in a consolidated group
with the company.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
58 Id. at 64,158.
59 There are exceptions to the requirement that a company have a majority of
independent directors and nominating/corporate governance and compensation
committee comprised entirely of independent directors for (1) any listed company of
which more than fifty percent of its voting power is held by an individual, group, or
another company; (2) limited partnerships; and (3) companies in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 64,159. The NYSE generally excepts from section 303A management
investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act. Id. at
64,159-60. A more limited series of exceptions is available for business development
companies that are not registered under the Investment Company Act. Id. at 64,160.
Except as otherwise required by Rule 10A-3, the new requirements would not
apply to trusts, derivatives, special purpose securities, or listed companies listing only
preferred or debt securities on the NYSE. Id.
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Nasdaq adopted similar, but less demanding, standards. 60
With respect to investment companies, the SEC separately requires covered funds to have a board usually with at least seventy-five
percent independent directors; the independent directors meet at
least once each quarter without any interested persons present; and
the independent directors be authorized to hire staff to help fulfill the
61
board's fiduciary duties.
In pursuing these initiatives with respect to investment companies, the three-Commissioner majority stressed:
Foreign private issuers would be permitted to follow home country practice except that these companies would be required to
(1) [h]ave an audit committee that satisfies the requirements of Rule 10A-3;
(2) notify the NYSE in writing after any executive officer becomes aware of
any non-compliance with any applicable provision; and (3) provide a brief,
general summary of the significant ways in which its governance differs from
those followed by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards.
Id.
60 Nasdaq Rules Regarding Board Independence, Exchange Act Release No.
47,516, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451 (proposed Mar. 17, 2003); Nasdaq Rules Regarding Board
Independence, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003).
Under NASD Rule 4350(c) (1) a majority of the directors of the board of each
Nasdaq-listed company would be required to be independent as defined in Rule 4200.
Id. at 64,161.
NASD Rule 4350(c) (2) requires independent directors to have regularly scheduled meetings at which only independent directors attend. Id. at 64,162.
NASD Rule 4350(c)(3)(A)-(B) requires the compensation of the CEO and all
the other officers of a listed company to be determined or recommended to the
board for determination either by a majority of the independent directors or by a
compensation committee that only includes independent directors. Id.
Similarly under NASD Rule 4350(c) directors must be selected or recommended
to the full board either by a majority of independent directors or by a nominations
committee that only includes independent directors. Id. at 64,163.
NASD Rule 4350(d) (2) (A) continues the requirement that at least one member
of the audit committee "have past employment experience in finance or accounting,
requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or background which results in the individual's financial sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive officer, chief financial officer or other
senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities." Id. at 64,163-64.
There are limited exceptions from the NASD corporate governance rules for
management investment companies, including business development companies, cooperative entities, asset backed issuers, and passive issuers such as unit investment
trusts. Id. at 64,175.
61 Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release
No. 26,323, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472 (proposed Jan. 15, 2004); Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378
(Aug. 2, 2004).
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Management-dominated boards may be less likely to effectively
undertake the many important responsibilities assigned to them.
The breakdown in fund management and compliance controls evidenced by our enforcement cases raises troubling questions about
the ability of many fund boards, as presently constituted, to effectively oversee the management of funds. The failure of a board to
play its proper role can result, in addition to serious compliance
breakdowns, in excessive fees and brokerage commissions, less than
forthright disclosure, mispricing of securities, and inferior investment performance. ,
We believe that a fund board must be "an independent force in
[fund] affairs rather than a passive affiliate of management." Its
independent directors must bring to the boardroom "a high degree
of rigor and skeptical objectivity to the evaluation of [fund] management and its plans and proposals," particularly when evaluating
conflicts of interest. To empower independent directors to better
serve as an effective check on fund management, we are proposing
to require funds to adopt better governance practices. Publicly
traded companies now are required by exchange listing standards
Many have been adopted voluntato have similar practices in place.
62
rily by some fund complexes.

B.

The Separation of the Board Chairfrom the Corporate
Chief Executive Officer

Twice in the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in contexts
other than general corporations, the SEC has also required a separation of the chair of the board of directors from the corporate chief
executive officer.
In December 2003, at an open meeting when the Commission
approved a reorganization of the New York Stock Exchange, 63 SEC
Chair William Donaldson announced that the NYSE had agreed to
64
split the jobs of NYSE Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.
In 2004 the Commission went further and required each registered investment company also to have a separate and independent
65
chair.
62

Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 3473.

63 See generallyJoel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or PerennialIrresolution: Stock Market Self-Regulation During the First 70 Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59
Bus. LAw. 1347 (2004).
64 Id. at 1377.
65 Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472 (proposal); Investment
Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378.
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On several occasions the Commission or its representatives have
articulated justifications for a separation of the chair from the CEO.
In 1979 SEC Chair Harold Williams endorsed the separation of
the board chair from the CEO, stating in part:
The ties which board members will feel to the CEO and their basic
desire to be supportive are compelling. The consequences of adding to that power the power of the chair and of the agenda process
must be weighed cautiously.., the intimidating power of the chair,
especially when occupied by a chief executive to whom many on the
board owe their directorships and perhaps their livelihood, is a fac66
tor which deserves serious consideration.
Chairman Williams stressed the different roles that the chair and
CEO have to perform: "[I]n the board environment, the role of the
chairman... is to create the kind of open, contributing and question67
ing environment ... The CEO's role is to speak for management."
Witnesses at SEC corporate governance hearings in the late 1970s
separately stressed the greater accountability of corporate management that can be achieved when the board chair and CEO are
68
separated.
66 Harold M. Williams, Corporate Accountability and Corporate Power, A Paper
Presented at the Fairless Lecture Series, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa. 9
(Oct. 24, 1979), quoted in SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AccOUNrABLITY, supra
note 12, at 473.
67 Id., quoted in SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supranote 12,
at 474.
68 See SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 12, at
471-75.
Commentators set forth several advantages which they perceived in having a separate chairman of the board and chief executive officer. One commentator, Joseph Alibrandi, President of Whitaker Corporation, described
the structure of that corporation's board, in which the chairman of the
board is an outside director, as having the following advantage:
... let's say [a director] had a question with regard to some financial
data or disclosure.., he would not have to put himself in the position
where he would have to go to management and say. [sic] "I would like
more information on such and such." He would go to the Chairman of
the Board who has the power to use an outside law firm to investigate
something that the company is doing. He can hire an outside consultant completely on his own to evaluate or develop information ...[S]o,
in effect, the outside directors would have the maximum capability...
to develop that objective view of how management was doing....
Courtney Brown has suggested that without differentiating the functions of the chairman and the chief executive officer,
it is difficult to see how the board of the future can be organized to
discharge fully the complex responsibilities required for the healthy de-
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Other commentators, however, expressed concern that if the
board chair or CEO were not compatible corporate performance
69
could be hindered.
More recently in enforcement actions the Commission has required the separation of the board chair and CEO "to promote future
compliance with the federal securities laws" 70 or because, as the SEC
explained with respect to investment companies:
Perhaps more important, the chairman of the board can have a substantial influence on the fund boardroom's culture. The boardroom culture can foster (or suppress) the type of meaningful
dialogue between fund management and independent directors
that is critical for healthy fund governance. It can support (or diminish) the role of the independent directors in the continuous,
active engagement of fund management necessary for them to ful71
fill their duties.
velopment of the corporation and the security of board members from
excessive liability.
According to Brown, the chairman should have two principal functions.
First, he or she should make certain that the board is properly discharging
its responsibility. "In the broadest outline, his job should be to encourage
...
consensus decisionmaking by a group of independently minded board
members in collaboration with management. . .

."

Second, the chairman

should assume the "burden of representing the company to its external publics: consumer groups, environmentalists, certain government agencies, business associations, institutional investors, even Wall Street analysts." The
chief executive officer, on the other hand, would be responsible for "managing" the corporation, and would not report directly to the chairman of the
board, but rather to the collective board, of which both he and the chairman
would be members.
Id. at 471-73 (footnotes omitted).
69 See id. at 475; cf. Patrick McGeehan, Breaking Up Is Still Hard to Do, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2004, § 3 (Sunday Business) at 4 (reporting that Board Chair Charles Schwab,
who earlier had separated positions of CEO and Chair at firm named after him, reassumed position of CEO). Alternatively a chair may prove too deferential to the CEO.
See, e.g., Kate Kelly, Painful Progress at the NYSE, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2004, at Cl
(noting that NYSE Chair Reed has taken a small office at the NYSE once occupied by
a secretary, and has taken a hands-off approach, largely limited to Monday morning
telephone calls).
70 See, e.g., Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., Litigation Release 18803, (July 28, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18803.htm.
71 Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release
No. 26,323, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472, 3474 (proposed Jan. 23, 2004); Investment Company
Governance, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg.
46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). The release continued:
A boardroom culture conducive to decisions favoring the long-term interest
of fund shareholders may be more likely to prevail when the board chairman
does not have the conflicts of interest inherent in his role as an executive of
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The most detailed elaboration of the differences in functions of a
separate CEO and chair approved to date by the SEC concerns the
Boston Stock Exchange (BSE).72 The BSE amended its Constitution
in 2004 to permit, but not require, the separation of the chair and
CEO to "allow for the independence of the Exchange's regulatory
functions from its marketplace functions. '7 3 The adoption release
explained:
If the Chairman and CEO are not the same person, then according
to the proposed revisions to the Constitution,. the Chairman, as an
executive officer of the Exchange, among other duties, would: (1)
the fund adviser. Moreover, a fund board may be more effective when negotiating with the fund adviser over matters such as the advisory fee if it were
not at the same time led by an executive of the adviser with whom it is negotiating. If such negotiation leads to lower advisory and other fees, shareholders would stand to benefit substantially.
Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 3475.
This theme was amplified in a Report of the Mutual Fund DirectorsForum, Best Practices and Practical Guidancefor Mutual Fund Directors, a nonprofit organization of mutual fund directors who made recommendations at the request of SEC Chair
Donaldson, and stated in part:
The Forum recognizes that the belief that a fund's chairman should be
independent of the fund's adviser is not today accepted by some in the mutual fund industry. Nonetheless, the Forum has concluded, on balance and
in light of the importance of the role of a fund's board chairman in creating
and steering the agenda of board meetings and in guiding discussions of the
board on various matters, that the goal of seeking to ensure that the interests
of a fund's shareholders are protected from conflicts involving the fund's
adviser can best be met when the fund's board is chaired by an independent
director.
Although a fund's board chairman should be an independent director,
the independent chairman's duties should not include supervision of the
fund's day-to-day operations, which should remain with its adviser. The role
of the independent chairman, by contrast, should be to assure that the independent directors control meeting agendas, the tone and tempo of board
meetings, the topics discussed, the amount of time spent on each topic and
the order in which topics are addressed. To enhance the participation and
effectiveness of the independent directors, the independent chairman
should endeavor to ensure, both directly and through regular communication with the fund's external service providers, that the fund's independent
directors are kept informed of developments between meetings on a regular
basis, as well as, of course, any significant events.
REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND DIREcToRs FORUM: BEST PRACTICES AND PRACTICAL GuiDANCE FOR MUTUAL FUND DIRECToRS 6 (2004), available at http://66.216.74.187/
PDFs/best-pra.pdf.
72 Separation of Board and Chief Executive Officer Positions, Boston Stock Exchange Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 49,611, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,833 (Apr. 23, 2004).
73 Id. at 23,834.
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Preside over all meetings of the Board; (2) be responsible to the
Board for the management of the BSE's regulatory affairs; (3) be
responsible for management of the regulatory affairs of all exchange facilities, subsidiaries, or other legal entities to which the
Exchange is party; and (4) act as Board liaison to the Exchange's
CEO and management. Similarly, if the Chairman and CEO positions are held by different individuals, then the CEO, among other
duties, would: (1) Be responsible for the management and administration of the affairs of the Exchange's marketplace functions; (2)
not participate in executive sessions of the Board; and (3) be sub74
ject to the authority of the Board.
The Commission approved this restructuring because "the proposed rule change is designed to help improve the governance structure of the Exchange by ensuring that the Exchange's regulatory
function is cordoned off from management of the marketplace function when two individuals hold the positions of Chairman and
75

CEO."

C.

The Chief Regulatory Officer

The 2003 NYSE reorganization also inspired a separate new idea
in corporate governance. In approving this reorganization, the Commission stressed the significance of the new Chief Regulatory Officer:
"The Commission believes that the proposed amendments to the
NYSE's governance structure, and in particular the creation of a Chief
Regulatory Officer reporting directly to an independent Regulatory
Oversight & Regulatory Budget Committee, add a significant degree
of independence that should insulate regulatory activity from economic pressures

....

76

This may be the most significant innovation in the NYSE reorganization. It means that a full-time Exchange employee will focus on
regulatory compliance and will report to the board without filtration
by other senior executives.
Id. Footnote 6 added:
The Exchange also proposes a Constitutional provision to clarify that the
general powers of the Board also would include the administration of the
regulatory function of the Exchange. Thus, while the person serving in the
capacity of Chairman or Chairman/CEO would be responsible for the management of the Exchange's regulatory affairs, the Exchange's Board would
continue to have ultimate oversight responsibility for the Exchange's regulatory functions.
Id. at 23,834 n.6.
75 Id. at 23,834.
76 NYSE Constitutional Amendment Regarding Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,946, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,678, 74,687 (Dec. 17, 2003).
74
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Subsequendy the Commission proposed a similar chief compliance officer for hedge funds7 7 and the NASD proposed Rule 3013 to
require each of the NASD members to designate a chief compliance
78
officer.
D.

Officer Certification and Internal Accounting Controls

In former Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill's account of his
service in George W. Bush's administration, there is a memorable account of a debate between O'Neill and Federal Reserve Chair Alan
Greenspan on the one hand and SEC Chair Harvey Pitt on the other
over what should be the Bush administration's response to Enron and
other corporate scandals. 79 O'Neill initially sought a negligence standard for CEO culpability for corporate financial statements under the
federal securities laws.
Ultimately Pitt and the SEC took the lead in proposing executive
certification rules before the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. 80
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires each quarterly
and annual report filed under section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the
1934 Act to be certified by the principal executive officer or officers
and the principal financial officer or officers.8 '
77 Registration Under the Advisor's Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172, 45,180 (proposed July 28,
2004).
78 Nasdaq Rule Relating to CEO and CCO Certification, Exchange Act Release
No. 48,981, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,704 (proposed Dec. 23, 2003).
79 RON SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF LOYALTY- GEORGE W. BUSH, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND
THE EDUCATION OF PAUL O'NEILL

224-30 (2004).

80 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Reports, Exchange Act Release No.
46,079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877 (proposed June 14, 2002); see also Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 46,300, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,508 (Aug. 8, 2002) (presenting supplemental information
on the proposed rule, issued after enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
81 Under section 302, each signing officer must certify that
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading;
(3) based on such officer's knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report;
(4) the signing officers (A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls;
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The personal responsibility imposed on the signing officers in
section 302 makes this among the most draconian sections of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While the Act does not go so far as to require
certification by board chairs, as earlier considered, the demand for
personal responsibility virtually screams from the legislative page.
There are, however, countervailing considerations. At many corporations the chief executive officers had become "salespersons in
chief." The certification requirement is a powerful reminder of the
need for chief executive and financial officers to be personally involved with a corporate compliance system. Certification also has the
collateral advantage of signaling to the securities market that it is less
likely that covered corporations will engage in future dysfunction.8 2
Moreover, the Commission had to take into account that section
13(b)(2) adopted in 1977 to require each reporting corporation to
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is
made known to such officers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are being
prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls as
of a date within 90 days prior to the report; and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their evaluation as of that
date;
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer's auditors and the audit
committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent
function)(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize, and report financial data and have identified
for the issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the issuer's internal
controls; and
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there
were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that
could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of
their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2004).
82 In August 2002 the Commission adopted rules that implement the certification
mandate in section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act instead of the certification contained in its June 2002 proposal. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly
and Annual Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 46,427, 78 S.E.C. Dock. 875 (Aug. 28,
2002).
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"devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that ... transactions are re-

corded as necessary (1) to permit preparation of financial statements
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles" had not
appeared to be effective in the period preceding Enron. Section
13(b) (2) was neither detailed and precise nor required executive
certification.
Where section 302 addressed executive certification, section 404
of Sarbanes-Oxley was intended to require a detailed system of internal controls. In 2003 the Commission adopted or amended several
Rules and Forms to implement the Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 404
requirement that companies reporting under the 1934 Act include in
report on the company's internal
their annual report a management
83
control over financial reporting.
For many boards of directors and outside auditors section 404 has
emerged as a key new responsibility of the board. Under most state
corporate law statutes, the board is "fully protected" when it relies on
the report of an outside accountant or management.8 4 Section 404
and the new SEC rules, in contrast, place responsibility on the management "to [establish] and [maintain] an adequate internal control
structure and procedures for financial reporting" and to annually assess its effectiveness. The registered public accounting firm is re85
quired to attest to this assessment.
Subsequently the PCAOB adopted Audit Standard No. 2, An Audit of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements. As approved by the
SEC, the new standard was estimated to increase audit costs by as
much as thirty percent to 100%.86
83 Disclosure Required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Exchange Act Release No. 46,701,
78 S.E.C. Dock. 1907 (proposed Oct. 22, 2002); Disclosure Required by SarbanesOxley Act, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, 80 S.E.C. Dock. 1014 (June 6, 2003).
84 See Delaware General Corporate Law § 141(e), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)
(2001).
85 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262.
86 Experts Split on Costs and Benefits of PCAOB's ProposedAudit Standard, 36 Sec. Reg.

& L. Rep. (BNA) 163 (2004);

ERNST & YOUNG, EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNAL CON-

TROLS: INTERNAL CONTROLS: INITIAL SURVEY

1 (Jan. 2004) (reporting on a survey of

100 major companies that found initial budgets of 10,000 to 200,000 new hours for
section 404 compliance), available at http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/
Library85/$file/EmrIntCtrls.pdf.
PCAOB Audit Standard No. 2 stated in part in paragraphs two of four:
2. A company subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (an "issuer") is required to include in its annual report a report of management on the company's internal control over
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The ultimate purpose of this new audit standard is to strengthen
the burden placed upon the board of directors and the chief executive and chief financial officers, who certify corporate financial statements, to be responsible for their integrity. It is a powerful, albeit
extraordinarily detailed, set of standards intended to significantly enhance the role of the corporate audit committee and the independent
auditor in reviewing the processes by which honest and accurate accounting and auditing can be produced within each covered firm.
III.

THE MODEST REVOLUTION ASSESSED

Within two years of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the basic model of
corporate governance for covered corporations has been revised.
Before the Act, corporations were required under NYSE and
other stock market listing standards to have an audit committee.
After the Act, NYSE and Nasdaq corporations are required to
have three committees (audit, compensation, and corporate governance and/or nomination), each of which at all times on the NYSE
financial reporting.... The report of management is required to contain
management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's ...

most

recent fiscal year, including a statement as to whether the company's internal control over financial reporting is effective. The auditor that audits the company's financial statements included in the annual report is
required to attest to and report on management's assessment. The company is required to file the auditor's attestation report as part of the annual report.
4. The auditor's objective in an audit of internal control over financial reporting is to express an opinion on management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting. To
form a basis for expressing such an opinion, the auditor must plan and
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over
financial reporting as of the date specified in management's assessment.
The auditor also must audit the company's financial statements as of the
date specified in management's assessment because the information the

auditor obtains during a financial statement audit is relevant to the auditor's conclusion about the effectiveness of the company's internal control
over financial reporting. Maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting means that no material weaknesses exist; therefore, the
objective of the audit of internal control over financial reporting is to
obtain reasonable assurance that no material weaknesses exist as of the
date specified in management's assessment.
PCAOB Audit Standard No. 2, Exchange Act Release No. 49,544, 69 Fed. Reg. 20,672,
20,673-74 (proposed Apr. 8, 2004); PCAOB Audit Standard No. 2, Exchange Act Release No. 49,884, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,083 (June 17, 2004).
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would be composed entirely of independent directors. The audit
committee now by statute has the power to hire and fire the outside
auditor. Moreover, a majority of the board itself also must be
independent.
Significantly, Sarbanes-Oxley and implementing SEC and PCAOB
rules focus on the mechanics of corporate governance to a much
greater degree than the earlier section 13(b) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act. Now there are detailed requirements for executive certification and internal accounting controls. Under the NYSE Listing
Standards, nonmanagement directors are required to meet without
management present.
At the same time, several of the most significant potential rules
for corporate governance either have not been adopted or have not
been adopted for corporations generally. The SEC failure to adopt a
shareholder access rule is particularly noteworthy. But so are several
ideas that have been adopted elsewhere such as the separation of the
corporate CEO from the board chair, the requirement that seventyfive percent of the board be independent, and the requirement of a
chief regulatory officer.
Underlying this modest and incomplete revolution are several
overlapping themes.
First, there is a general conviction, often articulated by the Commission, that greater compliance with federal securities and other relevant laws is more likely if the board is separate from senior corporate
executives. This theme accounts for the movement for a majority of
independent directors generally as well as requirements of board
committees comprised entirely of independent directors as well as the
nascent efforts to separate the corporate CEO from the board chair.
Second is a view not rooted in compliance considerations. Board
members' access to information and participation in the board is
more likely to be effective if the board chair and CEO are separate.
This recognizes a general conflict of interest. The board ultimately is
responsible for reviewing the performance of the corporate CEO. It is
difficult to do this if the CEO controls the operation of the board.
Similar considerations also support a majority or supermajority of the
board being independent or nonmanagement directors.
Third, more globally is a general concern that both boards and
outsiders including shareholders and regulatory agencies were not receiving full and accurate information about corporate finances. The
emphasis in Sarbanes-Oxley on the audit committee, new executive
certification and internal accounting requirements, and the creation
of the new PCAOB to regulate public accounting are all testimony to a
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policy preference to improve the integrity of mandatory corporate
disclosure.
Less emphasized as a policy concept to date has been the notion
that improving the diversity of board membership through director
electoral rules that increase the likelihood of outside shareholder factions successfully nominating directors is also likely to improve law
compliance, board function, or the integrity of the mandatory corporate disclosure.
What is missing from the SEC's initiatives to date has been a systematic review. When the SEC last seriously reviewed corporate accountability in 1980, it did so after detailed and thoughtful hearings
and with its staff producing a comprehensive reexamination of the
shareholder's role in corporate governance, the role of the board of
directors, and how both had significantly changed in the recent past.
This type of broad reexamination of corporate governance is overdue
today. Never in the history of the SEC has the integrity of corporate
governance been as sharply questioned as it was in the period of Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley. There has been no systematic effort by the
Commission outside of its staff proxy process report to examine how
well existing rules are functioning. Nor has there been an examination of what problems were associated with the major corporate dysfunctions that prompted and succeeded Sarbanes-Oxley or a review of
how the alternative remedies that have been advanced by the Commission and others work together.
The purpose of such a reexamination should not solely be to augment corporate regulatory requirements. There is a significant challenge for both the SEC and for the PCAOB with respect to the
corporate governance changes to date. The burden of compliance
with these standards is greater for small and medium sized firms than
for corporate giants. Over time it is reasonable to assume the SEC
and the PCAOB may take steps similar to those earlier taken by the
SEC with respect to the mandatory disclosure system to modulate
these requirements based upon the size and economic significance of
relevant firms. It may well prove to be the case that with our very
largest firms steps towards full separation of chairs of the board from
CEOs and establishment of chief regulatory officers are now long
overdue, while with our smallest firms the existing burden of full compliance with the new audit standard may prove particularly onerous.
The genius of an effective regulatory agency, if genius there be, is the
ability to modulate rules and standards over time as experience
teaches us about their effectiveness. The modest revolution in corporate governance may evolve as much by modulation of its burdens as it
does through further new requirements.

i186

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:3

